Competitive Pricing of Information : A Longitudinal Experiment (Record no. 28642)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02256pab a2200205 454500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 140923b0 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Transcribing agency Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai
Original cataloging agency Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title ENG
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number
Item number Chr
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Christen Markus
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Competitive Pricing of Information : A Longitudinal Experiment
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc.
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Feb 2007
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 0
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 42-56 Pp.
490 ## - SERIES STATEMENT
Volume/sequential designation XLIV
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Theoretical work on the pricing of information reveals that competition between independent information sellers can result in prices that are negatively related to the quality or reliability of the information. The theory argues that when information products are unreliable (low quality), independent products become complements, and competition can increase prices. The goal of this study is to test empirically the theory's counterintuitive predictions with the help of an experimental market based on a business simulation. Information products are market forecasts that are available from different competing information sellers; information buyers use these products to make repeated marketing decisions. Sellers set prices to maximize their profit, and buyers decide from which sellers to buy to maximize their own profit (through their marketing decisions). Buyers and sellers are assigned to one of two quality conditions: high-quality, reliable information and low-quality, unreliable information. The reliability of information products (forecasts) is exogenously set and must be inferred by both buyers and sellers from historical forecasts about another market. The results from this experimental market fully support the theory. After some experimentation, prices converge to levels that are strikingly different between the two quality conditions: Prices are significantly higher when the information sold is unreliable (low quality). Moreover, with few competing sellers of low-quality information, prices are higher than with a single seller or with a large number of competing sellers.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Pricing of Information,
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8738.pdf">http://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8738.pdf</a>
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
a 25517
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
        Main Library Main Library 30/05/2007 0.00   Chr AR8738 23/09/2014 0.00 23/09/2014 Articles

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