MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01735pab a2200205 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
140923b0 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Transcribing agency |
Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai |
| Original cataloging agency |
Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
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| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
ENG |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
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| Classification number |
|
| Item number |
Moo |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Moorthy Sridhar |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Price matching by vertically differentiated Retailers : Theory and Evidence. (With Abstract) |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT |
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| Edition statement |
2 |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
|
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
May 2006 |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
0 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
156-167 Pp. |
| 490 ## - SERIES STATEMENT |
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| Volume/sequential designation |
XLIII |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
This research examines vertically differentiated retailers' incentives to offer price-matching guarantees. It suggests that offering and not offering a price-matching guarantee are both signals of a retailer's service--price profile, a way of branding the retailer to uninformed consumers. The signals are made credible and costless by the presence of informed consumers. The authors show that when the service differentiation is large enough, only low-service retailers offer price-matching guarantees. Data from a sample of Canadian retail chains support this prediction. In addition, larger retail chains are more likely to offer price-matching guarantees than smaller chains, and competition has an interactive effect with service. As the intensity of competition a chain faces increases, lower-service retailers are even more likely to use a guarantee, and higher-service retailers are less likely to do so, suggesting that price-matching guarantees are competitive tools, not collusive tools, as the literature has often implied. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Retailer, Incentives, Price-Matching, |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="http://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8269.pdf">http://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8269.pdf</a> |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| a |
24361 |
