000			01602pab a2200205 454500
008			140923b0 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_cWelingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai _aWelingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai
041			_aENG
082			_a _bDuk
100			_aDukes Anthony J
245			_aChannel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry
250			_a1
260			_a _bFeb 2006 _c0
300			_a84-97 Pp.
490			_vXLIII
520			_aManufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of the growing channel dominance of retailers such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and other power retailers. The authors argue that this complaint might not be valid. In an analytical model of competing manufacturers and competing multiproduct retailers, the authors show that manufacturers may actually experience increased profits when a retailer gains an exogenous cost advantage over its rival retailer. Potential channel efficiencies exist when retailing costs are reduced. The authors illustrate that channel transactions based on bilateral bargaining capture these efficiencies by transferring market share to the more efficient retailer, thus increasing channel profits. In a bargaining relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer, the manufacturer realizes some of these enhanced efficiencies. The authors discuss the managerial implications for pricing in channels.
650			_aRetailing, Consumer Products, Wal-Mart,
856			_uhttp://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8549.pdf
906			_a25041
999			_c28461 _d28461