000			01735pab a2200205 454500
008			140923b0 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_cWelingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai _aWelingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai
041			_aENG
082			_a _bMoo
100			_aMoorthy Sridhar
245			_aPrice matching by vertically differentiated Retailers : Theory and Evidence. (With Abstract)
250			_a2
260			_a _bMay 2006 _c0
300			_a156-167 Pp.
490			_vXLIII
520			_aThis research examines vertically differentiated retailers' incentives to offer price-matching guarantees. It suggests that offering and not offering a price-matching guarantee are both signals of a retailer's service--price profile, a way of branding the retailer to uninformed consumers. The signals are made credible and costless by the presence of informed consumers. The authors show that when the service differentiation is large enough, only low-service retailers offer price-matching guarantees. Data from a sample of Canadian retail chains support this prediction. In addition, larger retail chains are more likely to offer price-matching guarantees than smaller chains, and competition has an interactive effect with service. As the intensity of competition a chain faces increases, lower-service retailers are even more likely to use a guarantee, and higher-service retailers are less likely to do so, suggesting that price-matching guarantees are competitive tools, not collusive tools, as the literature has often implied.
650			_aRetailer, Incentives, Price-Matching,
856			_uhttp://192.168.6.13/libsuite/mm_files/Articles/AR8269.pdf
906			_a24361
999			_c28192 _d28192